and McLaren (2017) recently challenged the view that individuals act with greater caution following the experience of a negative outcome by showing that a gambled loss resulted in faster reaction time (RT) on the next trial. Over three experiments, we replicate and establish the boundary conditions of this effect in the context of a simple game (rock, paper, scissors [RPS]). Choice responding against unexploitable opponents replicated the link between failure and faster responding. However, individuals with high win-rates against exploitable opponents initiated slower rather than faster responding following loss. The data suggest that the link between failure and impulsivity is limited to contexts where participants cannot exert control over outcomes.
According to the traditional view of posterror slowing (e.g., Notebaert et al., 2009 ) and conflict adaptation (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) , people are more likely to proceed with caution following failure. In contrast, Verbruggen et al. (2017) recently reported a series of experiments in which the experience of negative outcomes in a gambling context led to more impulsive (i.e., faster) RTs relative to the experience of positive outcomes. Understanding individual impulses when engaging with purely randomized gambling environments is clearly critical for addressing societal problems currently associated with fixed-odds betting terminal (FOBT) interactions. Verbruggen et al. (2017) described their data in terms of the acceleration of "approach behavior" since the central metric of interest was the speed with which participants initiated the next trial. This was distinct from a second, self-paced choice RT where participants decided whether or not to gamble again. Thus, the speeding associated with trial initiation might be quite different from the impulsivity associated with eventual choice RT. Indeed, their analysis of choice RT (Verbruggen et al., 2017, p. 157) was less clear in that responses following a gambled win were slower than a nongamble baseline, despite the trial being initiated faster. In other words, participants might have been more impulsive in their approach behavior but then were more cautious in deciding to gamble. To avoid the possibility that trial initiation and choice RT might conflict with one another, we focused on a simple RPS paradigm in which only one response was required per trial. Previous research using this paradigm (Forder & Dyson, 2016 ) also observed the finding of Verbruggen et al. (2017) in that choice RTs following negative outcomes (losses and draws) were faster than those following positive outcomes (wins), thereby supporting a more direct relationship between negative outcome and impulsivity.
One explanation for the observation of speeding following failure in gambling tasks but slowing following failure in cognitive tasks is the difference in responsibility one ultimately has in determining the outcome. Logically, if we operate in a purely random context then we are not culpable for our wins and losses. However, there are a number of gambling environments where outcomes are not only variable but also partly or wholly determined by skill (compare the continuum of roulette, blackjack, chess; Mauboussin, 2012) . Over three experiments, we establish a replicable boundary condition that challenges the conclusion that "losses have a general effect on action" and that "in the context of potential rewards [losses] are emotional events that increase impulsivity" (Verbruggen et al., 2017, p. 147) . To foreshadow our results, we found that (a) negative outcomes do generate faster (i.e., more impulsive) subsequent decisions when outcomes were the result of chance play against unexploitable opponents, but that (b) negative outcomes did not lead to impulsivity when participants exhibited high win rates against exploitable opponents. The data suggest that the degree of control one is able to exert over a variable outcome environment determines whether one becomes more or less impulsive after experiencing failure.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we attempted to replicate the findings of Forder and Dyson (2016) that negative outcomes yield faster decision making than positive outcomes during RPS. For one condition, participants competed with a computerized opponent who behaved according to the mixed-equilibrium strategy (MES; Baek et al., 2013) , with the randomized, equal (33%) selection of the three responses largely ensuring the lack of opponent exploitation.
1 This was contrasted with a second condition, where the computerized opponent was predictable on the majority of trials, and hence exploitable. We hypothesized that if impulsivity following loss was tied to a perceived inability to control outcomes, then this failure-faster link should be attenuated in the nonrandom (exploitable) condition relative to the random (unexploitable) condition.
Method
Fifty individuals (33 female) from the University of Sussex community participated in the study; mean age was 22.72 years (SD ϭ 5.71) and 42 were right handed.
2 Studies were approved for testing by the Life Sciences and Psychology Research Ethics Committee (C-REC) at the University of Sussex (ER/SEDD20/1), and participants were entered into a prize draw to win £25. Static pictures of a white-gloved hand on the right (representing the participant) and a blue-gloved hand on the left (representing the opponent) depicting rock, paper, and scissors poses were displayed center screen at approximately 6°ϫ 6°; participants sat approximately 57 cm away from a 22-in. Diamond Plus CRT monitor (Mitsubishi, Tokyo, Japan). Stimulus presentation was controlled by Presentation 18.1 (build 03.31.15; Neurobehavioral Systems, Berkeley, CA; www.neurobs .com).
Participants completed three conditions consisting of 120 trials, in a semicounterbalanced order. In the middle (unexploitable) condition, the computer opponent behaved according to MES (i.e., 40 rock, 40 paper, 40 scissors responses in random order). Participants were explicitly informed that their opponent would play randomly in this condition. The unexploitable condition was always flanked by a first and third condition (exploitable; the order of these two conditions was counterbalanced across participants), in which the computer behaved in accordance with a strategy for 72 (60%) trials where it would select the response that would have beaten the player's previous response (e.g., player trial n ϭ rock, computer trial n ϩ 1 ϭ paper), and MES for the remaining 48 (40%) trials. As a result of the behavioral isomorphism between differentially described strategies in RPS (Dyson, 2018) , there was an additional language manipulation in the instructions between first and third conditions. For the first condition, participants were told "for most of the trials in the block, the computer's strategy will be based on your previous selection." For the third condition, participants were told "for most of the trials in the block, the computer's strategy will be based on its last selection and outcome".
As a result of the equivalence in median RT (533 ms vs. 505 ms; t(37) ϭ 0.50, p ϭ .620) and win rate (43.79% vs. 43.35%; t(37) ϭ 0.26, p ϭ .795) between first and third conditions of the final sample (see the Results section), data was collapsed across these two conditions.
At the bottom of the screen, the cumulative scores for both computer and player were displayed, in addition to the trial count within that block. At each trial, the participant pressed one of three buttons corresponding to rock, paper, or scissors, prompted by the presentation of a fixation cross. Following response, the participant's selection was presented for 1,000 ms. After the clearing of the picture (500 ms), feedback was provided for a further 1,000 ms center screen as to whether the participant won, lost, or drew the trial. Scores were then updated during a 500 ms period (ϩ1 for win, Ϫ1 for lose, 0 for draw) and the next trial began with a fixation cross.
1 As one reviewer pointed out, this particular implementation of the MES raises the possibility of exploitation if a high degree of item bias is exhibited in the earlier stages of the block (e.g., opponent overplay of rock in the first half of the block dictates underplay of rock in the second half of the block). It is possible to estimate the degree of exploitation under such circumstances by examining participant win rate in the second half of the block, as a function of the absolute deviation from the rectangular 33.33% distribution for RPS responses expressed by the opponent in the first half of the block: if the player is sensitive to their opponent's item bias, a larger deviation expressed by the opponent in the first half of the block should yield higher win rate for the player in the second half of the block. We examined data from our supplementary experiment in which participants played three blocks of 75 trials against an MES opponent. Average absolute deviation from 33.33% for all three responses across the first 36 trials (range 1.86%-7.41%) and participant win-rate across the last 36 trials (range 22.22%-43.52%) was calculated within each block, and then averaged across block for each of the 36 participants. The nonsignificant, negative correlation between opponent random deviation and player win rate (r ϭ Ϫ.128, p ϭ .458) did not support the idea that participants were using item bias to increase their success in the unexploitable condition.
2 To estimate the effect size and, hence, minimal sample size required for the comparison of RT as a function of outcome in RPS, data from Forder & Dyson (2016) was utilized, collapsing across an original manipulation of value. With win RT ϭ 708 (SD ϭ 312), lose RT ϭ 555 (SD ϭ 207) and r ϭ 0.707, Cohen's d was estimated at 0.77. A sample size of at least 24 was estimated to observe this effect size (two-tailed) with ␣ ϭ 0.01 and a power of 0.95. Sample sizes were also additionally determined by the application of the same outlier removal procedure applied across all experiments, and, the studies being derived from an ongoing stream of research into competitive decision making that included other considerations such as individual difference measures and electrophysiological recording. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Results
Twelve participants were rejected as a result of their average median RT being at least twice as large as the group average median RT (after Forder & Dyson, 2016) within any analysis of variance (ANOVA) cell, resulting in a final sample of 38 (see Table A in the online supplemental materials for all descriptive statistics without outlier removal). A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA on trial n ϩ 1 median RTs using opponent (unexploitable, exploitable) and outcome at trial n (win, lose, draw; 
Discussion
Experiment 1 replicated the central result of Verbruggen et al. (2017) and Forder and Dyson (2016) that negative outcomes yielded more impulsive decision making than positive outcomes (the online supplemental materials and Table 1 confirm that the RT effect is carried by negative rather than positive outcomes by comparing game performance to a baseline where the participants merely observed the game). Negative outcomes yielded faster responding both when participants fruitlessly engaged with a random opponent (unexploitable), and also when they played against an opponent whose predominant strategy could be beaten (exploitable). While participants were more impulsive against an unexploitable relative to an exploitable opponent, the magnitude of the failure-faster effect was similar for both opponent types. One potential reason for this lack of distinction was that participants failed to successfully learn the correct strategy in the exploitable case, and so failed to control outcome to a meaningful degree. Indeed, this possibility may have been compounded by the use of two differentially described strategies that led participants to think that there were different rules to exploit. To increase the likelihood of strategy acquisition in Experiment 2, the frequency with which the opponent used their strategy was increased and the nature of the strategy was changed.
Experiment 2 Method
Forty individuals (31 female) from the University of Sussex community participated in the study; mean age was 21.13 years (SD ϭ 4.37) and 39 were right handed. The protocol for Experiment 2 was approved under University of Sussex ER/JS753/1, and participants received course credit or £10 for their participation. Experiment 2 involved a within-participants manipulation of both value (low, high) and opponency (unexploitable, exploitable) across four counterbalanced conditions (90 trials each). Value varied in terms of the points allocated for wins and losses (ϩ1/Ϫ1 in the low value condition, ϩ3/Ϫ3 in the high value condition, respectively) but was collapsed in the current analysis. In unexploitable conditions, the three responses of RPS were deployed randomly across 30 trials each (as per Experiment 1). In exploitable conditions, opponents used a strategy for 63 trials (now 70% rather than 60%) where it would select the response that would have been beaten by its own previous response (e.g., computer trial n ϭ rock, computer trial n ϩ 1 ϭ scissors), and played MES for the remaining 27 (30%) trials. The reduction in random (MES) trials increased the predictability of the opponent and increased the chance of exploitation. In Experiment 2, the initial fixation cross was replaced with pictures of the three RPS poses and the screen was cleared for 500 ms before rather than after response presentation. On every 9th trial, participants also reported their confidence about the forthcoming outcome. On any given block, participants were not explicitly informed about the exploitable or unexploitable nature of their opponents.
Results
Five participants were rejected as per Experiment 1, yielding a final sample of 35. Data revealed a nonsignificant main effect of opponent [F(1, 34) Note. Standard error in parentheses. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
against an unexploitable opponent, although the pattern of data was similar to Experiment 1, with lose and draw trials yielding faster subsequent responses than win trials. Against an exploitable opponent, however, lose trials (739 ms) were now statistically slower than draw trials (508 ms) and statistically equivalent but numerically slower than win trials (582 ms). Loss trials against exploitable opponents were also significantly slower than loss trials against an unexploitable opponent (535 ms).
Discussion
Experiment 2 provides a unique case (contra Verbruggen et al., 2017 and Forder & Dyson, 2016) where choice RTs following negative outcomes (specifically, loss) against an exploitable opponent were no longer faster than positive outcomes. In Experiment 3, we investigated the robustness of this interaction by using a different expression of strategy.
Experiment 3 Method
Forty individuals (28 female) from the University of Sussex community participated in the study; mean age was 22.95 years (SD ϭ 5.53) and 36 were right handed. The protocol was approved under University of Sussex ER/JS753/5. Experiment 3 again involved a within-participants manipulation of both value (low, high) and opponency (unexploitable, exploitable) across four counterbalanced conditions (90 trials each). This time, the low value conditions were associated with points only (ϩ1/Ϫ1), whereas the high value conditions were associated with points and converted to money at the end of the experiment at the rate of 10p per point (e.g., Losecaat Vermeer & Sanfey, 2015) . As such, participants received no less than £10 for the study but as in Experiment 2, performance was collapsed across value for the current analysis. Unexploitable and exploitable opponents were identical to Experiment 2, apart from in the exploitable condition the opponent now selected the response that would have beaten by its own previous response (e.g., computer trial n ϭ rock, computer trial n ϩ 1 ϭ paper) for 70% of trials.
Results
Ten participants were rejected as per previous experiments, yielding a final sample of 30. Data revealed a significant main effect of opponent [F(1, 29) 
Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated the findings of Experiment 2 where the experience of loss did not lead to more impulsive action on the subsequent trial when outcomes could be controlled as a result of playing against an exploitable opponent. One reason why this effect was not present at the group level in Experiment 1 was that the degree of exploitation was lower than in Experiments 2 and 3 (60% strategy and 40% random, compared with 70% strategy and 30% random). To test the idea that the degree to which participants were able to take control of the game outcome determined whether failure initiated impulsivity, individual win-lose rates were plotted against RT differences between lose and win trials during exploitation conditions in Experiment 1, r ϭ .647, p Ͻ .001, Experiment 2, r ϭ .577, p Ͻ .001 and Experiment 3 (r ϭ .575, p ϭ .001; Figure  1 ). It was apparent that for those individuals who established high win-loss ratios, a losing trial tended to slow rather than speed subsequent responding. Although the data are correlational rather than causal in nature, the suggestion here is that when participants develop a successful counterstrategy against their opponentallowing for a high degree of exploitation (wins)-loss trials slowed down rather than sped up subsequent decision making.
General Discussion
Across three experiments using the game space of RPS, we established an important boundary condition under which the experience of a negative outcome leads to subsequent impulsive behavior (Verbruggen et al., 2017) . Impulsive behavior following failure is more likely when an individual cannot control the outcome of their environment either due to (a) interacting with an unexploitable opponent, or, (b) interacting with an exploitable opponent whom they fail to exploit. Across all three experiments, we saw that when participants were able to enact a high degree of opponent exploitation, loss trials led to less impulsive rather than more impulsive reactions.
The failure-faster link in random environments (e.g., unexploitable conditions) remains critical in understanding the emotional, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
cognitive, and financial investments afforded by automated and random gambling systems such as FOBTs (Clarke, 2004) . Nevertheless, gambling environments with variable outcome can also have a large skill-based component. The observation that participants can still act impulsively following negative outcomes as a result of low win-rate in exploitable conditions underscores how the quality of own our metacognition regarding performance, and the perceived degree of control we have over outcomes (e.g., Langer & Roth, 1975) , might perpetuate the magnitude and frequency of loss (e.g., tilting, Laakasuo, Palomäki, & Salmela, 2015; chasing behavior, Mitzenmacher & Upfal, 2005) . Most strikingly, the observation that participants act less impulsively following loss during successful exploitation represents an important constraint in the relationship between loss and impulsivity. One possibility is that this observation reflects expectancy violation. This would appear to be true in the case where a participant selects the putatively correct response on the basis of their opponent's common strategy, but their opponent happens to select from their (random) MES distribution on that trial. However, losses need not necessarily represent expectancy violation, such as cases where the player does not yet have a reliable understanding of their opponent's dominant strategy. The current data would also seem to suggest that it is only unambiguously negative outcomes (losses) rather than ambiguously negative outcomes (draws) that puncture the failure-faster link (see Gu et al., 2017 , for further discussion). Future research incorporating individual differences in empathy, locus of control, personal understanding of luck-skill balance, accuracy of metacognition regarding one's own performance, and the use of early neural responses to predict eventual behavioral outcomes will serve to further identify the conditions under which one becomes more or less impulsive as a function of outcome.
